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FCMDT: A Novel Fuzzy Cognitive Maps Dynamic
Trust Model for Cloud Federated Identity
Management
Keltoum Bendiab, Stavros Shiaeles, Samia Boucherkha, and Bogdan Ghita
Abstract—Efficient identity management system has become
one of the fundamental requirements for ensuring safe, secure
and transparent use of cloud services. In such a borderless
environment, entities belonging to different network domains
need to cooperate dynamically with each other by exchanging
and sharing a significant amount of personal information in a
scalable, effective and seamless manner. The traditional approach
to address this challenge has been identity federation, aiming to
simplify the user experience by aggregating distributed rights
and permissions. However, the current federated identity man-
agement solutions are missing mechanisms to achieve agile and
dynamic trust management, which remains one of the biggest
obstacles to their wide adoption in cloud computing. In this paper,
we aim to address this issue by introducing a novel dynamic
trust model for Federated Identity Management. The proposed
model relies on fuzzy cognitive maps for modelling and evaluating
trust relationships between the involved entities in federated
identity management systems. This trust mechanism facilitates
the creation of trust relationships between prior unknown entities
in a secure and dynamic way and makes Federated Identity
Management systems more scalable and flexible to deploy and
maintain in cloud computing environments. In addition, we pro-
pose a set of trust features for Federated Identity Management,
which serves as a basis for modelling and quantifying the trust
level of unknown entities. The effectiveness of the proposed trust
model is proven through performance analysis and experimental
results.
Index Terms—Cloud computing, fuzzy cognitive maps, feder-
ated identity management, FIM, IdP, trust management.
I. INTRODUCTION
SECURE and efficient identity management in and acrossclouds is one of the main challenges currently faced by
cloud computing [1], [2], [3]. In such a borderless environ-
ment, a wide range of stakeholders, including cloud con-
sumers, businesses, partners and loud providers, need to coop-
erate dynamically with each other by exchanging and sharing
a massive amount of resources and users’ sensitive data in a
scalable, effective and seamless manner [2],[3]. In this context,
Federated Identity Management (FIM) is considered the most
useful solution to achieve reliable and effective collaboration
among various domains that simplifies the user experience
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by allowing efficient authentication mechanisms and use of
identity information from data distributed across multiple
domains [4], [5]. It typically involves Identity Providers (IdPs)
and Service Providers (SPs) in a trust structure called Circle
of Trust (CoT), based on business agreements [5]-[7]. The IdP
is responsible for the complete user management and does the
authentication process in order to validate the user identity [6],
as well as sharing identity information with various trusted SPs
in the CoT. Meanwhile, the SP provides access to services and
protected resources to users who are authenticated by a trusted
IdP [6]. FIM provides many benefits for cloud environments
[5], [6], such as increased simplicity by using cross-domain
SSO (Single Sign-On) features, reduced number of credentials,
seamless access to resources, and reduced administrative costs
of user accounts [5]-[7].
The research community proposed several FIM systems.
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [8] and WS-
Federation [9] are the predominant use case in these systems
because of the scale of their deployment in several sectors
(enterprise, educational networks, e-government, etc.). They
are already implemented in many products, and serve as a
foundation for the majority of identity federation protocols
including Liberty Alliance [10] and Shibboleth [11]. In ad-
dition, well-known protocols OpenID [12], OpenID connect
[13], FIDO (Fast ID Online) [14] and SCIM (Simple Cloud
Identity Management)[15] are also lightweight FIM systems
originally designed for relatively simple applications. All these
frameworks typically follow a similar architecture based on
pre-configured, static and closed CoT, in which interactions
are only possible with pre-configured entities [7],[16]. The pre-
established CoTs are typically rigid and have poor scalability,
which leads to closed and isolated communities [6], [16].
Moreover, trust relationships are manually set and managed
by administrators using trust anchor lists with a public key
infrastructure [16], [17]. While convenient for setting up long-
term relationships on server-to-server communication, such a
trust model is unsuitable for dynamic environments such as
cloud computing [18], where trust between parties within a
federation process should be created dynamically on-demand
instead of being statically defined. In the case of OpenID,
OpenID connect, and SCIM, there is no specified model
to manage trust between CSPs and OpenID providers, as
CSPs must decide by themselves which OpenID providers are
trustworthy [8].
Poor management of trust in these systems carries signifi-
cant security and privacy risks [7]. Identity theft within an IdP
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or an SP, misuse of identity information by SPs and IdPs, and
trustworthiness of the user are the most active problems and
concerns in FIM [6]. The evidence from many studies shows
that the sharing and processing of user sensitive information
by SPs and IdPs typically involves the collection of user data
without user consent [7], [16], [18]. Collected data can be sub-
sequently compromised or improperly disclosed by malicious
CSPs and IdPs, which may lead to further information leakage.
These issues are further complicated in cloud environments
due to their highly dynamic, multi-tenancy, insecure, and open
nature.
Motivated by the shortcomings of existing FIM frameworks
and aiming at contributing to solve the cloud computing
identity management issues, especially the lack of agile and
dynamic trust management, we propose in this paper a new
trust model that allows dynamic and secure management of
trust relationships between unknown entities in cloud environ-
ments. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• A comprehensive set of trust features needed to build
trust between CSPs and IdPs in the context of FIM is
proposed. The proposed set is used as a basis to model
and quantify the trust level of unknown entities.
• A dynamic trust management model for FIM is proposed.
The proposed model relies on Fuzzy Cognitive Maps
(FCM) for modelling and evaluating the trustworthiness
of unknown entities (e.g CSPs or IdPs) based on the pro-
posed set of trust features. The effectiveness of FCMs to
model the uncertainty of trust in complex and dynamical
systems was widely proven by prior studies [19]-[22].
Applying the proposed trust model, a CSP can predict
the trust level of the target IdP in real time and decide
whether to establish or not a trust relationship with it and
vice versa, which allows trust relationships to be established
on-demand and makes the FIM approach more suitable for
cloud environments. The trust model presented here extends
and improves our prior work in [24].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides a critical review of the current state of the art in
dynamic FIM. Then, Section III presents the basic concepts of
FCMs and we define the set of trust features for FIM in section
IV. We introduce the proposed system in section V. Then,
the implementation and the experimental results are presented
and analysed in Section VI. In Section VII, we conduct
a comparison between our proposal and representative trust
management models specifically built for cloud computing
environments. Finally, Section VIII summarises the paper and
outlines our future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Dynamic trust management in FIM systems represents
a topical research area and several dynamic FIM systems
have already been introduced by prior studies conducted by
individuals or research and international groups [25]-[31].
In [32], the ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards
Institute) proposed a set of recommendations to achieve ad-
hoc federation establishment based on dynamic SLA (Service
Level Agreement) negotiations. The study shows that using
bilateral static agreements is not feasible for a global scale
federated internet. In this regard, the ABFAB (Application
Bridging for Federated Access Beyond Web) working group
from the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) proposed
the ABFAB Architecture [33] that addresses the problem of
dynamic trust establishment in non-web-based services. The
proposed architecture outlines the need for a TRP (Trust
Router Protocol) for the creation of dynamic relationships
between providers. The main functions of the TRP are the
distribution of information about existing trust relationships
within the ABFAB federation and allow a new provider to
be dynamically added to the federation. The “Distributed
Dynamic SAML” [34] is another project proposed by the
Internet2 group. The aim of this work is to achieve the
distribution and dynamism that can solve challenges regarding
deployment, scalability and interoperability of existing SAML
federations. The notion of "dynamic" implies various means
to support discovery and auto-configuration instead of static
pre-arrangement between the interacting parties. The proposed
work reduces the manual steps in trust management and makes
federation establishment faster, but the trust management still
depends on static pre-established relationships.
As SAML is one of the most widely used technologies to
enable identity federations among different domains. There
have been several works that provide proposals to tackle the
problem of dynamism of this protocol such as works in [17],
[27], [28], [29]. In [17], the authors proposed a generic ex-
tension for the SAML standard, which facilitates the creation
of dynamic trust relationships between unknown parties and
minimizes the dependence on previous configurations. Each
entity will maintain a dynamic list called Dynamic Trust List
(DTL), instead of the static TAL (Trust Anchor List), which
will contain the list of joined entities in the same federation
with their reputation data and will be updated dynamically as
the federation evolves. That makes entities more autonomous
in making trust decisions. However, this approach has signif-
icant implementation issues, as SAML is typically designed
for limited-scale identity federation and it does not fully
address interoperability, privacy, or deployment. In the same
context, the authors in [25] proposed a dynamic trust policy
language that extends the Attribute-based Trust Negotiation
Language (ATNL) to support dynamic trust management for
Single Sign-On (SSO) architectures and allows an untrusted
CSP to automatically join an existing CoT through negotiation.
This approach provides a flexible dynamic trust management
but fails to capture a number of identity management issues,
including questions regarding policy deployment and users
privacy, such as using a vocabulary suitable only for a subset
of users and organizations. In [30], the authors introduce
the notion of Trust Service Provider (TSP) in the context of
FIM. The TSP is a centralized trust management component
which can automatically establish trust relationships between
federation parties in runtime. It reduces the overhead of an
organisation joining a federation, by requiring it to register
each of its FIM parties on the TSP with a unique entityID
and related metadata, and then communicate securely with all
other parties within the federation. This approach makes trust
management more flexible and empowers the user privacy. Un-
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fortunately, the centralized architecture decreases significantly
the scalability of FIM system since the list of trusted entities
increases.
Several Dynamic FIM systems based on cloud identity
broker-model have emerged, such as [26] and [31]. In [26], the
authors introduce a trusted third party as a trust broker for the
management of the trust relationship among services in-cloud
or across clouds. With this trusted intermediary, the transitive
federation may be dynamically established and be available to
a broader range of cloud services. In [31], the authors propose
an identity broker model that introduces federating identity
brokers between SP and IdP. This new model enhances the
user privacy through cryptographic mechanisms, in particular
re-encryption proxies. These models reduce significantly the
cost of trust established with external cloud services, although
they have many security and privacy issues given that the
identity data are stored and processed in the cloud. In addition,
the model in [26] requires both the user and the CSP to rely
on the same central identity broker for both identification and
authentication.
This review reveals that none of the analysed systems is able
to heuristically cover all the trust aspects in FIM, including
security, privacy, scalability, interoperability, implementation
and deployment, as they all have inherent trust implemen-
tation or scalability weaknesses. Furthermore, these systems
do not include a dynamic trust model to provide them with
the flexibility required for deployment and maintenance in
cloud environments. Hence, we propose in this paper a novel
dynamic trust model that addresses these trust challenges by
using a Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM) to integrate FIM systems
and cloud computing. The details of the proposed system are
provided in the following sections.
III. FUZZY COGNITIVE MAPS (FCM)
Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCMs) are a convenient, simple,
and powerful qualitative technique used to model and compute
trust in complex and dynamical systems [19], [22]. They were
introduced by Kosko [19] enhancing the cognitive map [20]
concept with the extension of the fuzzified causal relation-
ships. FCMs bring several advantages over other modelling
techniques, including great flexibility in representation [21],
comprehensible structure and operations, capability to handle
dynamic effects, ability to deal with fuzzy information, and
transparency of the underlying model [35].
An FCM is typically a signed fuzzy weighted digraph. It
consists of a set (C1, C2, . . . , Cn) of n interconnected nodes
representing variable concepts of the modelled system such as
inputs, outputs, states, events, and signed weighted arcs which
describe the causal relationships between these nodes and
interconnect them [20]. These nodes (concepts) interact with
each other to illustrate the dynamics of the model. Given two
concepts Ci and Cj , the edge weight wij that interconnects
them is a given value on the interval [−1, 1] to indicate
three possible types of relationship [21]: positive causality
(wij > 0), negative causality (wij < 0) or independence
(wij = 0) between the two nodes; the value of wij indicates
how strongly concept Ci influences concept Cj [22]. The
map is represented in a weight connection matrix Wn×n [26].
Within the matrix, row i represents the causality between
concept Ci and all other concepts in the map [22]. The state
vector A1×n represents the current values of the n concepts
(nodes) in a particular iteration. The value of each concept is
computed from the influence of other concepts to the specified
concept, by applying the calculation rule in Equation (1) [22].
A
(t+1)
i = f
A(t)i + n∑
j=1j 6=i
A
(t)
j ×Wji
 (1)
where A(t+1)i is the value of concept Ci at time step t+1,
A
(t)
i is the value of concept Ci at time step t, whereas, f is
the threshold or activation function for converting the output of
each computation to the range [0, 1] or [−1, 1]. The activation
function can output either discrete or binary concept values or
continuous concept values. One such widely used function in
the literature is the hyperbolic tangent function [36], which is
defined as fellow:
f(x) = Tanh(λ× x) = e
λx − e−λx
eλx + e−λx
(2)
Where λ > 0 is a constant parameter used to adjust a proper
form or slope of the function named degree of fuzzification.
Researchers should define a specific value to this parameter
fitting the context under investigation [36]. For large λ values
(e.g., λ > 10), it approximates a discrete function, while, for
smaller λ values (e.g., λ < 1) it approximates a linear function.
Fig. 1 shows an example of a simple FCM which consists of
5 nodes and 10 arcs. The rows in its weight connection matrix
are the source nodes and the columns are the destination nodes
[36].
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
C1 0 +w12 0 0 -w15
C2 +w21 0 -w23 -w24 0
C3 0 0 0 0 +w35
C4 +w41 0 -w43 0 0
C5 0 0 -w53 +w54 0
Fig. 1. A simple FCM and its weight connection matrix.
FCMs have shown promising results by successfully mod-
elling real-world problems and indicating a strong ability to
capture the dynamic aspects of the system’s behaviour [19],
[20], [21], [22]. In addition to the dynamic characteristics
of FCMs [19] and their learning capabilities [22], the fuzzy
nature of these qualitative tools makes them essential for
modelling the uncertainty of trust in complex environments
[19], [22]. Compared to the related works, this technique
has the potential to improve the way that trust is established
between unknown entities by increasing the flexibility and
agility of the trust model. This has prompted us to propose
a new dynamic and lightweight FCM-based trust computation
approach, which attempts to exploit the advantages offered by
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TABLE I
FEATURES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS FOR FIM
Feature Description CSP IdP
C1: Security It refers to CSP or (IdP) The ability of the CSP or (IdP) to fulfil security requirements, such as
authentication, authorization, integrity, and availability.
× ×
C2:Privacy The ability of the CSP or (IdP) to fulfil privacy requirement, such as limited disclosure of user
attributes, user consent and control. A privacy policy has a positive relationship with trust.
× ×
C3:Dependability The ability of the CSP or (IdP) to fulfil reliability, maintainability, usability, availability, and safety
requirements.
× ×
C4:Reputation The uniformity of the CSP (or IdP) behaviour, derived from the trustee’s past experience or
opinions reported by third parties.
× ×
C5: Anonymity The ability of the IdP to preserve the user privacy by using anonymous or pseudonymous identifiers,
allowing the user to choose and provide consent regarding the attributes that he/she wants to release
to the CSP.
×
C6:Limited Disclosure The ability of the CSP to request only the minimum number of user attributes required to access
any of its services and to use them only for the stated purpose(s).
×
C7:Communications The ability to digitally sign and exchange between the IdP and the CSP claims holding user
attributes over secure channels by using secure communication protocols, such as HTTPS, SSL.
× ×
C8: Confidentiality The ability to provide IdP with satisfactory mechanisms to register, store and issuing user attributes
safely and securely (strong encryption algorithm can proves the confidentiality of user attributes).
×
C9: Integrity The ability of the IdP to ensure the integrity and the quality of the identity credentials by using
an audit and verification mechanism.
×
C10: Availability The ability to ensure that a system is operational and that it is accessible to those who need to use
it. Adequate measures should be in place to prevent and detect the malfunctions of the system,
such as high uptime percentage.
× ×
C11: Authentication The ability of the IdP to use a strong authentication mechanism that releases users attributes as
per the requirement.
×
C12: Authorization The ability of the CSP to adhere to the non-disclosure of attributes, not abuse the released attributes,
and maintain the agreed policies and procedures regarding access control.
×
C13: Interoperability The degree of technical, operational, and legal interoperability between the CSP and the IDP. × ×
C14: Trustworthiness The level of trust of the CSP or the IdP. × ×
these tools, in the dynamic and complex environment of cloud
computing.
IV. TRUST FEATURES FOR FIM
Trust is one of the most complicated concepts in open
and dynamic environments because it is inherently subjective,
context-dependent, non-symmetric, uncertain, and partially
transitive [37]. It is influenced by many measurable and non-
measurable properties including security, privacy, reliability,
availability, and ability [37], [38]. In the context of FIM, the
concept of trust and trust management is a widely studied topic
and has been defined in numerous ways. For the purpose of
this paper, we use the definition from [12].
“Trust is the expression between parties that one party
(trustor) to a relationship agrees to believe statements (also
called claims) made by another party (trustee)”.
This means that trust is founded on particular beliefs that
the trustor has about the trustee. These beliefs are derived
from strong evidence, such as history, experience, knowledge
about the entity’s nature, recommendations and certificates
from trusted entities. This definition gives a directional rela-
tionship between the “Trustor” and the “Trustee”. However,
in FIM, the trust relationship between the IdP and the CSP
is bidirectional [18], both the IdP and the CSP have to trust
each other. In particular, IdPs (as trustors) have to trust the SPs
(as trustees) to securely handle and process a received user’s
identity data in a way that conforms to data protection laws
[39], whereas the SPs (as trustors) have to trust the IdPs (as
trustees) to correctly authenticate users that want to access
their services and protected resources [39]. This means that
the features influencing the trust level of each entity must be
identified.
In FIM, there are many features that build trust between
CSPs and IdPs [18], [39], [42]. However, there is no unified
standard for selecting them, as there are only a few research
projects that focus on the analysis and identification of trust
features for FIM. Authors in [7], [18], [40]-[42] proposed a
comprehensive set of trust features that are needed for the
various FIM scenarios and topologies. In all these studies, the
set of the required trust features is typically divided into secu-
rity, privacy, and functional requirements. Proposed features
in [41] were used in [42] to evaluate trust between entities
in a federation and to assess the quality of service provided
by IdPs or CSPs. In [43], the authors proposed a novel
taxonomy of trust risks in cloud FIM, which were divided into
three main categories: security and privacy, knowledge, and
interoperability. The main purpose of this new classification is
the dynamic creation of trust relationships between untrusted
entities in a secure way. In [44], the Trans-European Research
and Education Networking Association (TERENA) proposed
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a set of features or requirements that must be covered in the
real-world federation agreements in order to ensure sufficient
trust and security among the different participating IdPs and
CSP in real-world federations. This study shows that security
and privacy were the most important considerations that must
be taken into account before creating real-world federations.
To conclude this review, it is apparent that there is no
standard or common set of contributor trust features to es-
tablish a dynamic federation between providers; instead, each
of the studied works proposes a set of different features which
cover some of the trust aspects in FIM. For example the
interoperability is only considered in [7], [43], while it is an
indispensable feature for establishing real world-federations
[44]. Similarly, the availability is not considered in [38]-[40].
Moreover, in all those studies, the security and privacy are
taken into account to some extent. For example, the security
of the identity information in the transport level is ignored
in [38] and [39]. Similarly, the limited disclosure, which is an
important privacy related-feature [7], [44], is not considered in
some studies. Consequently, in this paper, we aim to cover all
the trust features needed to obtain a more accurate trust model.
For that, we proposed a set of features that can influence the
trust level of IdPs and CSPs. The features were chosen based
on the TERENA recommendations for real-world federation
agreements [44]. The proposed set improves our prior set
of features in [24]. In addition, it is intended to be generic
compared to previous work and useful for any FIM protocol. In
this paper, we use the notion of “trustworthiness” as a measure
to quantify the trust level of the CSP or the IdP.
Table I summarizes the proposed set of features. Sign ×
means that the trustworthiness of the CSP (IdP) is influenced
by this feature. For example, the trustworthiness of the IdP is
influenced by feature C11 (Authentication) since this security-
related feature ensures that the IdP has implemented the
required methods to correctly authenticate users that want
to access the CSP services and protected resources [44].
Meanwhile, the trustworthiness of the CSP is influenced by
the feature C12 (Authorization) which ensures that the CSP
will securely handle a user’s identity data [44]. Some features
influence the trustworthiness of both the CSP and the IdP
such as C7 (Communication) [44] because in the context of
FIM, it is strongly recommended to use secure communication
protocols by the interacting parties (CSPs and IdPs).
V. TRUST COMPUTATION MODEL
In this section, we present our trust computation model
for FIM. the proposed model allows to dynamically measure
the trustworthiness of unknown entities using the FCM tool.
Before explaining how the trust model is applied, we begin
first with an overview of the system architecture.
A. System architecture
The proposed solution involves three entities: cloud users
(CU), the IdP and the CSP. The CU send service requests to
the CSP. Before providing the corresponding services for the
CU, the CSP requires proper identification and authentication.
The IdP is responsible for authenticating the registered CU
and validates its identity. The IdP is ultimately trusted by the
CU.
Trust establishment is managed directly between the CSP
and IdP themselves, without the need for central authorities or
intermediaries. Fig. 2 illustrates the core idea of our system,
which involves three major stages. The first stage occurs when
the CU sends a request to access the protected resources
of a CSP but the CSP does not trust the IdP that handles
its identity. Then, in stage 2, the CSP and IdP can use the
proposed trust model to compute the trustworthiness of each
other in real time. In this step, the trust management service
computes a trust value related to the collaborating entity.
Based on this trust value, it decides whether to initiate or
not a transaction with the other entity. If the trustworthiness
evaluation is successful, a trust relationship is automatically
established between the CSP and the IdP in step 3. After that,
the CSP and the IdP can exchange identity information in
order to validate the CU identity.
Identity Data exchange
Trust
IdP
Untrusted CSP
Authentication 
service
Trust 
management 
service
Identity 
Data
Protected 
resources
Trust 
management 
service
Interface of 
communication
CU
CoT
Request Trustworthiness evaluation Identity Data Flow1 2 3
2
3
1
Fig. 2. The general architecture of the proposed system.
The trust management service is the core part of the system
that evaluates the trust level of unknown entities by using the
FCM. It takes initial values of trust features as input and then
outputs the final trust value. Depending on this value, the CSP
can decide whether to establish or not a trust relationship with
the target IdP. The IdP performs the same steps to determine
if it should interact with the CSP or not. The gathering of the
trust features values is performed in the second stage, where
the trust management service uses the information available
in the entity metadata, the protocol in use, and the internal
policies to quantitatively measure the initial values of the trust
features. More details about the approach used to compute the
initial features values are given in section V-C.
The following sections explain how the trust model is
applied.
B. FCM model Construction
In our approach, the trustworthiness of each entity (CSP
or IdP) is modelled as a directed graph G(C,E) using FCM,
where C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cn} is a finite set of nodes that
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represent the features influencing the CSP (or IdP) trust-
worthiness (Table I), and E is a finite set of k edges that
represent the causal relationships between features, where
E = {eij/i, j ∈ C,E v C × C}.
Each edge eij that interconnects the Ci and Cj features has
a relative weight wij ∈ [−1,+1], which represents the degree
by which node i influences node j. As mentioned in section
III, the weight wij indicates three types of interrelationships
between nodes, which are positive, negative, or zero. The
positive interrelationship means that any change in the source
node will positively change the situation of the destination
node. The negative relationship is reverse and zero denotes
that the two nodes do not have any interrelationship [22].
Since the possible value of wij is not known precisely due
to its subjectivity, the fuzzy set theory [45] is used to describe
its vague nature using linguistic variables from the fuzzy set
T . The fuzzy set T is comprised of nine linguistic variables, as
presented in Table II together with the corresponding triangular
membership functions, as shown in Fig. 3.
TABLE II
STATES OF THE FUZZY SET T
Linguistic variables (States) Membership
function
(Triangular)
Triangular mem-
bership region
Negatively very strong (NVS) µNV S (-1, -1, -0.75)
Negatively strong (NS) µNS (-1, -0.75, -0.5)
Negatively medium (NM) µNM (-0.75, -0.5, -0.25)
Negatively weak (NW) µNW (-0.25, 0, -0.25)
Zero (Z) µZ (-0.25, 0, 0.25)
Positively weak (PW) µPW (0, 0.25, 0.5)
Positively medium (PM) µPM (0.25, 05, 0.75)
Positively strong (PS) µPS (0.5, 0.75, 1)
Positively very strong (PVS) µPV S (0.75, 1, 1)
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
-1 -0,75 -0,5 -0,25 0 0,25 0,5 0,75 1
Th
e 
m
em
b
er
sh
ip
 d
eg
re
es µNVS µNS      µNM µNW µz µPW µPM µPS µPVS
Fig. 3. Membership functions of the linguistic variable influence.
At this step of the FCM construction, the fuzzy value of the
weight wij is computed based on input from experts [22]. In
this method, each expert estimates the strengths of the causal
relationships between features based on their knowledge by
using linguistic variables from the fuzzy set T ( Table II).
Then, all the proposed linguistic values for the same weight
wij , suggested by experts, are aggregated using the SUM
fuzzy inference method and an overall linguistic weight is
produced. At the end of this step, the Center of Gravity (CoG)
defuzzification method [22] is used to calculate the crisp value
of wij which belongs to the interval [−1,+1]. A detailed
description of this method is given in [22], [23]. This formally
replicates the expert knowledge into the system, allowing it to
take similar decisions based on the input factors.
As an example, if three experts 1, 2 and 3 propose the
respectively linguistic values PS, PVS and PS for the weight
wij , these linguistic variables (PS, PVS and PS) are summed
and an overall linguistic weight is produced. Then, through
the CoG method, the overall linguistic weight is transformed
into the crisp value 0.79, as shown in Fig. 4.
Y
First expert
Second expert
Third expert
1
1
1
0.5
0.5 0.75 1
0.5
0.5
0.5 0.75 1
0.75 1
Aggregation of Linguistic 
variables using SUM
Membership 
Function
0.5
Y
1
0.5 0.750.79
C
µ PS
µ PS
µ PVS
Y
Y
1
Fig. 4. Aggregation of the three linguistic variables (PS, PVS and PS) using
the SUM technique. Point C is the numerical weight after defuzzification
using the CoG method.
Based on the CoG result, the weights matrix for the CSP
map (IdP map) can be built after determining all the weights
using this approach. For each wij ∈ Wn×n, if i = j, then
wij = 0, because it is assumed that no concept can cause
itself.
By using this method, each CSP or IdP can propose their
own causal weights that meet their requirements because the
various components of trust evolution do not have the same
impact and importance. Depending on the scenario require-
ments, for a specific CSP in a specific context, the security of
the IdP is more important than its availability. That means a
CSP or an IdP can use a team of experts to apply the proposed
technique and determine their weight connection matrix, as
their internal policies change or differ from other use cases.
C. Assurance levels for the trust features
Before computing the trust level of the unknown entity (CSP
or IdP), the constructed FCM map (section V-B) must be
initialized, which requires defining the initial value of each
of the map’s nodes. These values are based on measurements
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TABLE III
ASSURANCE LEVELS FOR THE TRUST FEATURES
Features Metrics Levels Quantitative
values
Source
C5: Anonymity
No anonymity Low 1
Defined high-levels of assurance based on
the Kantara privacy framework for identity
federation [49] and recommendations in
[7] for identity management.
Anonymous credentials Medium 2
Anonymous credentials and anonymous authorization High 3
C6: Limited disclosure
No user-control and consent Low 1
Partial user-control and consent Medium 2
Full user-control and consent High 3
C7: Communications
Non secured channels (HTTP) Low 1
Based on TERENA recommendations [44].Partially secured channels (HTTPS) Medium 2
Secured channels SSL/TLS protocol High 3
C8: Confidentiality
Legacy-use encryption algorithm and key length Very low 1
Based on NIST 800-131A specifications
[49]. The encryption algorithm is used to
provide confidentiality for identity
information, while, the digital signature
proves the integrity of the identity
information.
Restricted encryption algorithm and key length Low 2
Deprecated encryption algorithm and key length Medium 3
Acceptable encryption algorithm and key length High 4
Approved encryption algorithm and key length Very high 5
C9:Integrity
Legacy-use digital signature and key length Very low 1
Restricted digital signature and key length Low 2
Deprecated digital signature and key length Medium 3
Acceptable digital signature and key length High 4
Approved digital signature and key length Very high 5
C10:Availability
80% ≤ Availability < 95% Low 1
Defined high-level of assurance
(Self-defined based on the study in [52])95% ≤ Availability < 99% Medium 2
Availability ≥ 99% High 3
C11:Authentication
Simple Password and PIN Low 1
Based on NIST 800-63 Levels of
Assurance (LOA) metrics [47]
Single-factor authentication Medium 2
Multi-factor authentication High 3
Multi-factor authentication and Hard tokens Very high 4
C12:Authorization
Simple password Low 1
Defined high-levels of assurance based on
the authorization type [51].Identity-based authorization Medium 2
Role-based authorization or Attribute-based authoriza-
tion
High 3
C13:Interoperability
Only technical interoperability Low 1
Defined high-levels of assurance based on
TERENA recommendations [44].Operational and technical interoperability Medium 2
Legal and operational and technical interoperability High 3
from the real system and gathered in the initial state vector
Ainitial(0), where Ainitial(0) = {C1, C2, . . . , Cn}, n ≥ 1.
The interactions in the FCM are caused by the change in
the value of one or more concepts. In our approach, the initial
values of the concepts are calculated from the information
available in the entity metadata, assertions policies, and the
protocol in use. The method used to compute the values of
these nodes is inspired from the Level of Assurance (LOA)
metrics defined by NIST 800-63 [47] to quantitatively measure
the strength of identity proofing. This specification forms the
basis of many frameworks for authentication assurance such
as the Kantara framework [48], the ETSI specification for ad-
hoc FIM [32], or the risk assessment framework in [43]. In
our approach, each feature is assigned with qualitative levels
of trust or confidence (i.e. assurance), including very low
assurance, low assurance, medium assurance, high assurance,
and very high assurance. These assurance levels are mapped to
the quantitative values 1, 2 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Then, the
mapping function (3) is used to convert the qualitative value
of each feature to the range [0, 1].
m(x) =
v(Ci)− vmin(AL)
vmax(AL)− vmin(AL)
(3)
Where v(Ci) is the quantitative value of the node
Ci, vmin(AL) is the minimum assurance level value and
vmax(AL) is the maximum assurance level value for the
feature Ci. For example, if node Ci = C11 (authentication)
has a medium assurance level (v(C11) = 2) (Table III), the
corresponding numerical value of this node in the interval [0,1]
would be (2−1)/(4−1) = 0.33. While, if node C9 (integrity)
has a medium assurance level (v(C9) = 3) (Table III), the
corresponding numerical value of this node in the interval [0,1]
would be (3− 1)/(5− 1) = 0.5.
Following this approach, Table III overviews the different
levels of assurance used to compute the initial values of
features from C5 to C13. These levels were designed fol-
lowing the guidelines from well-known specifications such as
NIST 800-63 [46], NIST SP 800-131A [47] and TERENA
[44]. However, new assurance levels have been proposed for
features for which there are no existing specifications.
For ease of understanding, Table III provides only a high-
level definition of the LOAs, but more details can be found
in the referenced documents. For example, for authentication,
according to the assurance levels defined by NIST in [46],
FIM transactions with a multi-factor authentication mech-
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anism should have higher confidence level than a single-
factor authentication mechanism or a simple password. For
the anonymity feature, anonymous authorization should have
the highest level of confidence because it ensures that a
CSP never links an authorization request to information that
identifies a cloud user [50]. Meanwhile, the confidentiality and
the integrity of the identity information can be successfully
achieved by using strong encryption algorithm and digital
signatures [47]; for example, encryption algorithms with small
key size (e.g. SHA-1) are considered to provide lower integrity
strength than those with long key size (e.g. SHA-512) [49].
The initial values of the features C1, C2, C3 and C4 are
set to 0 because, according to the TERENA recommendations
[44] and the NIST.IR.8149 report [46], their values depend on
the values of other features (Table I); for example, the value
of feature C1 (security) can be derived from the values of
the integrity, confidentiality, authentication, and authorization
features [44], [46]. Thus, the initial value of this feature is set
to 0.
D. Trustworthiness evaluation algorithm
This section presents the trust evaluation algorithm which
uses the constructed FCMs in order to evaluate the trust level
of CSPs and IdPs. First, the FCM map must be initialized,
which means that the initial value of each of the map’s nodes
must be defined, as described in section V-C, and gathered in
the state vector Ainitial(0) . After initialisation, the following
steps are used to compute the last value of trust (node C14).
• Step 1: Multiply the initial state vector Ainitial(0) and
the weights matrix Wn×n defined by experts using the
calculation rule in equations (1) and (2).
• Step 2: The resultant vector is used as the initial vector
in the next iteration and it is updated using equations
(1) and (2). Step 2 is repeated until A(t) − A(t − 1) ≤
e = 0.001. This termination condition helps to stop the
iterative process of the trust evaluation algorithm.
• Step 3: Make the trust decision based on the last value of
the node C14 obtained in the final state vector Afinal(0).
The last value of the trustworthiness depends on the con-
cepts values that belong to the interval [0, 1]. It also depends
on the weights values of the causal relationships between
features that belong to the interval [-1, 1]. Therefore, in the
general case, the last value of trustworthiness is in the interval
[-1, 1]. For the interpretation of the results, we propose in this
paper an assessment only for the last value of the output node
C14 according to the following criteria:
R(x) =

Untrusted, x < 0.4
Low trust, 0.4 ≤ x < 0.6
Medium Trust, 0.6 ≤ x < 0.8
Trusted, x ≥ 0.8
(4)
The "Trusted" criterion means that the evaluated entity to
a certain extent respects all the trust features, which makes
it more trustworthy. The "Medium Trust" criterion means that
the CSP can trust the IdP and vice versa, but this can be risky
because some trust features are not fully satisfied. While in
the cases of "Low Trust" and "Untrusted", most or all of the
trust features are not satisfied which makes the evaluated entity
untrustworthy. Because there is no unified security perspective
that can be followed by all existing federations, the proposed
criteria can be modified according to each CSP and IdP
security policies.
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we describe and analyse the experiments car-
ried out over the proposed trust model in order to demonstrate
its effectiveness and reliability.
1) The effectiveness will determine whether the proposed
scheme can consistently provide trust calculation accord-
ing to the assets and needs of the provider who is making
the evaluation.
2) The computational efficiency of the trust system, bench-
marked using the time overhead metric will determine
whether the proposed trust model can manipulate the
rising of input access requests without noticeable loss
in quality of service.
The simulation experiments were performed on the cluster
of the centre of High-Performance Computing of the FRERES
MENTOURI University 1, runing on Intel (R) Xeon (R) CPU,
16 cores 2.20 GHz and 24 GB memory. In the cluster, each
entity (CSP and IdP) is deployed in a separate VM, in which
the trust management service is implemented. Fig. 5 illustrates
the implemented architecture and its components.
initial values of the trust 
features computation
Internet
Trust management service
Trustworthiness 
Computation
SQL 
Database
CSP
Cloud users Requests
SQL Database
External source
(trust features)
IdP
Fig. 5. Implemented architecture for the simulation scenarios.
The following sections describe the test scenarios and
discuss the experimental results.
A. Effectiveness of the proposed system for trust evaluation
The goal of these experiments is to evaluate the effective-
ness of our approach for trust computation based on the needs
of the provider that is making the evaluation (CSP or IdP).
To this end, we have developed a proof-of-concept prototype
1https://centre.umc.edu.dz/hpc/
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that implements the proposed trust model. Fig. 6 shows the
prototype architecture for each entity. In the prototype, the
trust management service was implemented using Java, the
fuzzy system was developed based on the JFCM (Java Fuzzy
Cognitive Maps) library which is an open source library, the
weight connection matrix is defined in an XML document, and
the trust features values are stored in a MySQL database. As
shown in Fig. 6, in each of the test scenarios, we have as input
an initial state vector Ainitial(0) gathering the initial values of
the trust features and the proposed weight connection matrix.
As output, we have a final state vector Afinal(0) representing
the last state that it may arrive to.
Entity  (CSP or IdP)
Weight connection matrix
SQL Database
Final state vector
SQL 
Database
Initial state vector
Aggregated initial values 
of the trust features
External Data
Trust management service
Trustworthiness 
Computation
Fig. 6. Simplified schema of the trust evaluation process for each scenario.
In the simulation scenarios, we have used one CSP and one
IdP. For each entity, we have proposed a weight connection
matrix by using the approach described in section V.B, based
on three experts’ opinions. The weight connection matrix
for the CSP (Wcsp) and the IdP (WIdP ) are defined in
Tables IV and V and the corresponding graphic descriptions
are illustrated in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. In the constructed matrix,
the security-related features (confidentiality, integrity, autho-
rization, authentication, availability and communication) were
considered as the main influential features on the entities
trustworthiness. That means lower values of these features
should lead to lower trust levels and vice versa. Therefore,
we proposed for each entity two different scenarios, one with
low values for security-related features and the other with high
values for these features.
1) Value of the parameter λ: As mentioned in section
III, the hyperbolic tangent function (equation (2)) includes
a lambda parameter for defining function slope which is
the degree of fuzzification. Its value must be established by
the FCM designer and can be chosen based on experiments
or experience [35], [36]. In this context, Authors in [36]
suggested that appropriate value of λ can be arrived during
experimentation phase because the choice of λ affects the
performance of the FCM model. In our approach, the value of
this parameter is chosen based on experiments, where diverse
values of λ were examined through the validation analysis to
use the proper one. Throughout the experimental analysis, we
TABLE IV
INITIAL WEIGHTS MATRIX OF CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS FROM THE CSP
Features C1 C2 C3 C4 C6 C7 C10 C12 C13 C14
C1 0 0.55 0 0.55 0 0 0 0 0 0.79
C2 0.55 0 0 0.55 0 0 0 0 0 0.71
C3 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.60
C4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.55
C6 0.50 0.83 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0
C7 0.75 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C10 0.55 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C12 0.80 0.25 0 0.55 0 0 0 0 0 0
C13 0 0 0.63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fig. 7. MAP of the Causal relationships from the CSP.
TABLE V
INITIAL WEIGHTS MATRIX OF CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS FROM THE IDP
Features C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C13 C14
C1 0 0.55 0 0.55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.79
C2 0.55 0 0 0.55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.71
C3 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.60
C4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.55
C5 0 0.55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C7 0.60 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0
C8 0.65 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C9 0.65 0.60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C10 0.55 0 0.55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C11 0.65 0.65 0 0 0 0 0.55 0.55 0 0 0 0
C13 0 0 0.63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Fig. 8. MAP of the Causal relationships from the IdP.
applied many scenarios for the varying λ values, by calculating
the last trust value using the algorithm described in section V-
D for each λ value, for both the CSP and the IdP. The test
scenarios are discussed below.
In the first group of experiments (a) we used the initial
state vector Ainitial(CSP ) = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0.5, 1, 1, 1, 0.5, 0}
and the weight connection matrix from Table IV . In the second
group of experiments (b), we used the initial state vector
Ainitial(IdP ) = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0.5, 1, 0.75, 0.75, 1, 0.66, 0.5, 0}
with the weight connection matrix from Table V. The results
for the group of experiments (a) and (b) are illustrated by the
graphs in Fig. 9 and 10.
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Fig. 9. The last trust values according to the different values of the parameter
λ for the CSP
From the obtained results, for both the CSP and the IdP, it
was observed that the trust evaluations made by the system
were most accurate and acceptable with the value of λ being
0.5. While higher values of λ lead to higher values of trust
and lower values of λ lead to lower values of trust. Based on
the examined scenarios, we chose lambda=0.5 for our study.
2) Scenarios for the IdP map: In the first scenario, we have
an IdP with a low security mechanism (low authentication
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Fig. 10. The last trust values according to the different values of the parameter
λ for the IdP
mechanism (C11 = 0), low integrity (C9 = 0.25), low con-
fidentiality (C8 = 0.25), non secure communication channel
(C7 = 0), low availability (C10 = 0)), and medium anonymity
and interoperability (C5 = C13 = 0.5). Intermediate features
from C1 to C4 and the output C14 are set to 0 to indicate
no effect. In the second scenario, we have an IdP with
a high security mechanism (high authentication mechanism
(C11 = 0.66), high integrity (C9 = 0.75), high confidentiality
(C8 = 0.75), high secure communication channel (C7 = 1)
, high availability (C10 = 1)), and medium anonymity and
interoperability (C5 = C13 = 0.5). Intermediate features from
C1 to C4 and the output C14 are set to 0. Thus, the initial
state vectors for the two scenarios are presented in Table VI.
TABLE VI
INITIAL STATE VECTOR FOR EACH SCENARIO FOR THE IDP
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C13 C14
Scenario 1 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 0.5 0
Scenario 2 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 0.75 0.75 1 0.66 0.5 0
From Table VII(scenario 1), we can observe that after
the FCM inference through the trustworthiness evaluation
algorithm described in the previous section, the resulting
IdP map starts to interact and simulates the trustworthiness
evaluation procedure. New values of features were calculated
for 4 iterations. From the results, we concluded that at the
4th iteration step, the FCM reaches the stop state and all the
casual values were propagated through intermediate features.
The last trust value is C14 = 0.3632 which means that the
trustworthiness level of this IdP is low (Untrusted) according
to the criterion in Equation(4).
In the second scenario (Table VIII), the final state vector is
reached at 3 simulation steps with a final trust value C14 =
0.8491 which means that the trustworthiness level of this IdP
is high (Trusted) according to the criterion in (4).
From these experiments, we conclude that the security-
related features (authentication, confidentiality, integrity, avail-
ability and the communication channel) have a high influence
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TABLE VII
FEATURES VALUES FOR EACH ITERATION STEP (IDP MAP) FOR THE FIRST
SCENARIO
Iteration steps
Features 0 1 2 3 4
C1 0 0.1515 0.2277 0.2287 0.1955
C2 0 0.2783 0.2952 0.2463 0.1891
C3 0 0.1469 0.1364 0.0957 0.0599
C4 0 0.1106 0.1849 0.2066 0.194
C5 0.5 0.2307 0.108 0.0507 0.0238
C7 0 0 0 0 0
C8 0.25 0.1169 0.0548 0.0257 0.012
C9 0.25 0.1169 0.0548 0.0257 0.012
C10 0 0 0 0 0
C11 0 0 0 0 0
C13 0.5 0.2307 0.108 0.0507 0.0238
C14 0 0.2129 0.3496 0.3863 0.3632
TABLE VIII
FEATURES VALUES FOR EACH ITERATION STEP (IDP MAP) FOR THE
SECOND SCENARIO
Iteration steps
Features 0 1 2 3
C1 0 0.8556 0.8889 0.8147
C2 0 0.8048 0.8222 0.7394
C3 0 0.428 0.4051 0.2995
C4 0 0.4273 0.5942 0.6196
C5 0.5 0.2449 0.1218 0.0608
C7 1 0.4621 0.227 0.113
C8 0.75 0.5053 0.3401 0.2239
C9 0.75 0.5053 0.3401 0.2239
C10 1 0.4621 0.227 0.113
C11 0.66 0.3694 0.2099 0.1185
C13 0.5 0.2449 0.1218 0.0608
C14 0 0.6923 0.85 0.8491
on the trustworthiness level of an IdP, low values of these
features decrease significantly the last value of trust and vice
versa. Thus, in the two scenarios, the map was converged as
desired and the obtained results were decisive for the trust
decision in the FIM context.
3) Scenarios for the CSP map: In the first scenario, we
have a CSP with a low security mechanism (low autho-
rization mechanism (C12 = 0), non secure communication
channel (C7 = 0), low availability (C10 = 0)), medium
limited disclosure (C6 = 0.50) and medium interoperability
(C13 = 0.50). The intermediate features from C1 to C4 and
the output C14 are set to 0. In the second scenario, the security-
related features C7, C10, and C12 are set to a high value (1).
Interoperability and limited disclosure are set to a medium
value (C6 = C13 = 0.50), and the intermediate features from
C1 to C4 and the output C14 are set to 0. Table IX presents
the initial state vectors for the two scenarios.
Table X shows that in the first scenario, the final state vector
TABLE IX
INITIAL STATE VECTOR FOR EACH SCENARIO FOR THE CSP
Features C1 C2 C3 C4 C6 C7 C10 C12 C13 C14
Scenario 1 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0
Scenario 2 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 0
is reached at 4 simulation steps with a last value of trust
C14 = 0.3568 which means that the trustworthiness level of
this CSP is low (Untrusted). Meanwhile, in the second scenario
(Table XI), the final state vector is reached at 3 simulation
steps with a final trust value C14 = 0.8251 which means
that the trustworthiness level of this CSP is high (Trusted)
according to the criterion in (4). From the results, in both
scenarios, we get the same conclusions as in the CSP scenarios
and the map was converged as desired.
TABLE X
FEATURES VALUES FOR EACH ITERATION STEP (CSP MAP) FOR THE
FIRST SCENARIO
Iteration steps
Features 0 1 2 3 4
C1 0 0.1194 0.1886 0.1975 0.1731
C2 0 0.2239 0.2416 0.2083 0.162
C3 0 0.15 0.1422 0.1019 0.0651
C4 0 0.1495 0.2103 0.2189 0.1973
C6 0.5 0.2354 0.1125 0.0539 0.0258
C7 0 0 0 0 0
C10 0 0 0 0 0
C12 0 0 0 0 0
C13 0.5 0.2354 0.1125 0.0539 0.0258
C14 0 0.2014 0.3337 0.3765 0.3568
TABLE XI
FEATURES VALUES FOR EACH ITERATION STEP (CSP MAP) FOR THE
SECOND SCENARIO
Iteration steps
Features 0 1 2 3
C1 0 0.8258 0.8274 0.7203
C2 0 0.5809 0.6134 0.5328
C3 0 0.4872 0.4574 0.3383
C4 0 0.6195 0.6981 0.6476
C5 0.5 0.2449 0.1218 0.0608
C7 1 0.4621 0.227 0.113
C10 1 0.4621 0.227 0.113
C12 1 0.4621 0.227 0.113
C13 0.5 0.2449 0.1218 0.0608
C14 0 0.6905 0.8393 0.8251
Many other scenarios were applied on the CSP map with
different initial state vectors, the obtained results show that
the security features were the most influencing features on the
trustworthiness level of the CSP which is the objective of the
constructed maps for these simulation scenarios.
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B. Computational Efficiency Analysis
The goal of these experiments is to assess the performance
of the proposed method by using the time overhead met-
ric to evaluate their computation efficiency. Through these
experiments, we will check that the proposed trust model
can manipulate the rising of input access requests without
noticeable loss in QoS. In the tests scenarios, the number of
input requests changes from 1000 to 10,000.
For an effective evaluation of our approach, we used three
kinds of time overhead: Tagg , Tc, and Ttotal, where Tagg is
the time overhead of the aggregation and computation of the
initial values of the trust features, Tc is the time overhead of
the trust computation, and Ttotal is the total time overhead of
the trust system. It is composed of the two periods of time
Tagg and Tc.
In the first group of experiments, we separately computed
and compared the two times Tagg and Tc, in order to check the
impact of each phase on the overall overhead (Ttotal). For Tagg
time overhead, for the experiment purposes, 10,000 samples
of information that represent external entities are collected in
an external SQL database. Then, the features were collected
from the external SQL database and computed using Equation
(3). In this group of experiments, the trust management service
configuration is (Intel (R) Xeon (R) CPU, 16 cores 2.20 GHz,
24 GB memory and 7 TB hard disk space) (Fig. 5).
Fig. 11 shows the comparison results for Tagg and Tc. From
these results, we can notice that the time overhead of the initial
feature values aggregation Tagg phase is always greater than
the time overhead of the trustworthiness computation phase
(Tc). This is due to the fact that external sources were used
to collect and compute the initial values of features. We can
also notice that the two time overhead Tagg and Tc increase
with the number of input requests but not significantly.
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Fig. 11. The Tagg and Tc overhead (sec) comparison
In the second group of experiments, we computed the total
time overhead Ttotal of the proposed system for different
configurations of the trust management service. The total time
overhead Ttotal is composed of the two periods of time Tagg
and Tc. For each request, the initial values of the trust features
were collected and computed using equation (3)(Section V-C),
then gathered in an SQL database. After that, the trust evalu-
ation system takes these values as input and outputs the final
trust value using the trustworthiness computation algorithm
described in section V-D. The experiments were conducted for
three different configurations of the trust management service.
The first configuration is C1:(Intel (R) Xeon (R) CPU, 4 cores
2.20 GHz, 8 GB memory and 2 TB hard disk space). The
second configuration is C2:(Intel (R) Xeon (R) CPU, 8 cores
2.20 GHz, 12 GB memory and 7 TB hard disk space). While,
the third configuration is C3:(Intel (R) Xeon (R) CPU, 16
cores 2.20 GHz, 24 GB memory and 7 TB hard disk space).
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Fig. 12. The total time overhead Ttotal (sec) for the three configurations of
the trust management service (C1, C2 and C3)
From Fig. 12, we can see that the time overhead increases
with the increase of the number of entities (CSP or IdP) to be
evaluated but the increase is not significant and depends on the
resources used in the configuration of the trust management
service. It is gradually reduced with the resources growing
(CPU, memory size) as the value of the total time overhead is
less in the second configuration of the trust management ser-
vice (C2) than in the first one (C1). In the third configuration
of the trust management service (C3), the value of total time
overhead became far less than in the first one (C1). From the
obtained results, we can get the conclusion that the QoS of the
proposed scheme is not significantly affected by increasing the
number of the input requests as the time overhead decreases
significantly with the increase of the resources used by the
trust management service (CPU, memory size). Although the
proposed FCMDT method has not been tested in a real cloud
environment, it can be concluded from our experimental results
that it is suitable for cloud computing as the resources is not
an issue in such platforms, thus overhead will be negligible.
For the comparative analysis of the obtained results with
other works, there are no results from the cited works in this
paper which can be compared with our work.
C. Limitations
The main objective of the experiments is to prove the
effectiveness and reliability of the proposed FCMDT method.
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Despite the promising results that have been demonstrated
by these experiments, it should be noted that the proposed
approach has not been tested in a real cloud environment
with real-world cases. As an extension of this work could
be other research to compare our method in real large-scale
environments and produce comparative results with other
methods.
VII. COMPARISON WITH OTHER METHODS
In this section, we compare our trust model with rep-
resentative trust management models specifically designed
for dynamic FIM in cloud computing environments. In the
literature, there is no specific assessment criterion that can
be used in the comparison. Thus, the comparison is made
based on the selected criteria from studies in [7],[53]-[56].
These studies have proposed certain criteria that a cloud trust
management system should possess. The selected criteria have
been identified in the literature as essential to the development
of effective FIM models for cloud environments and are the
most frequently applied. A brief description of these criteria
is given below:
1) Trust management technique: Cloud-based trust man-
agement techniques can be classified into four categories:
Policy (PocT), Recommendation (RecT), Reputation (RepT),
and Prediction (PrdT). [54]-[56]. The PocT uses a set of
policies that assume multiple authorization levels with a
minimum trust threshold (e.g., if the SLA is satisfied, the
CSP (IdP) is considered trustworthy) [55], [56]. RecT takes
advantage of entities’ knowledge of trusted parties, especially
given that the party at least knows the source of the trust
recommendation. Recommendations from trusted entities can
be explicit or transitive [55]. The RepT, compute aggregated
trust metrics based on feedback received from different entities
based on their previous interactions [56]. Aggregate feedbacks
can have a direct or indirect influence on the trustworthiness of
a particular entity. For example, feedback from different cloud
service consumers can significantly affect the trustworthiness
of a particular CSP, positively or negatively. PrdT is very
useful for a cloud environment, especially when there is no
prior information about interactions (e.g., history of successful
or unsuccessful interactions) [56].
2) TMS Privacy: TMS (Trust Management System) privacy
is a fundamental concern in cloud computing. It refers to the
degree of sensitive information disclosure that users may face
during interactions with the trust management system [53].
One way to preserve privacy is to use anonymization tech-
niques that can reduce multiple privacy threats (e.g., tracking
of user’ behaviour by malicious CSP and IdP), by keeping the
owner of the identity information secret from other entities
[55]. “High” level is assigned if the trust model assures user
privacy through anonymization techniques or cryptographic
mechanisms. “Low” level is assigned to this feature if it is
not assured by the trust model.
3) Data Control and Ownership: This feature means that
the disclosure of personal information is under the complete
control of the user. Lack of user control can lead to unautho-
rized disclosure of sensitive data, leading to a breach of privacy
and security [53], [55]. Thus, a trust model providing user
control assurance is preferable to keep the sensitive data secure
[53]. “High” level is assigned if the model assures user consent
and control through access control policies or cryptographic
mechanisms. “Low” level is assigned to this feature if it is not
assured by the trust model.
4) TMS integrity: The trust model should be capable of as-
suring the integrity and accuracy of users’ sensitive data in the
cloud [53]. “High” level is assigned if the trust model ensures
the data integrity through encryption techniques. “Medium”
level is assigned if data integrity is ensured through SLAs or
certificates. “Low” level is assigned if the trust model does
not provide any guarantee about the integrity of data stored in
the cloud.
5) Scalability: Refers to the ability of the trust mechanism
to grow in one or more aspects [53], [55],such as the number
of trust evaluation inquiries that can be handled in a given
period of time and the number of trust relationships that
can be supported. “Low” level is assigned to indicate that
the TMS is not scalable or has limited scalability in cloud
computing. TMS that follows a centralized architecture is not
scalable in cloud environments [53]. Similarly, policy-based
TMSs have limited scalability and they are not suitable for
cloud environments [7], while the “High” level indicates that
the TMS is scalable in cloud environments such as TMS that
follows a decentralized or distributed architecture [53], [55].
6) Federated Identity (FI) Protocols used: Refers to
the capability of the trust model to be deployed with
different Identity Protocols [7] such as SAML, or REST
(Representational state transfer). This factor helps to identify
the portability level of the trust model [55].
Analysis
As can be seen from Table XII, the proposed model has
several qualitative advantages over previous models. First,
each of the discussed models considers some of the selected
criteria but not all. Meanwhile, all these criteria are considered
in our model. Many studies such as [2], [4], [54], [55] show
that considering all these criteria is necessary to obtain a more
reliable and flexible trust model for cloud FIM.
First of all, the use of fuzzy logic increases the flexibility
of our approach and of [43] as it models the uncertainty of
trust. However, the dynamic characteristics of FCMs and their
great ability to capture dynamic aspects of system’s behaviour
make our model more flexible than work in [43]. None of the
other analysed models handle the element of uncertainty that
may arise in dynamic environments such as cloud computing.
The TMS privacy criterion is respected in our approach by
the consideration of the anonymity feature in the measure
of trustworthiness. Similarly, this criterion is also considered
in [30] by the use of a unique entityID for all parties of a
federation to ensure anonymity. In [31], [43], this feature is
achieved by the use of cryptographic mechanisms in particular
re-encryption proxy in [39], while it is not considered in [25],
[26], [28], [56], as cryptographic mechanisms and anonymity
are completely missing in these systems.
The data control and ownership criterion is not accounted
for in [25], [26], [28], [30]. The potential liability of the IdP
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TABLE XII
COMPARATIVE ANALYSES OF DYNAMIC TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Trust mechanisms
Criteria
TM technique TMS
Privacy
Data Control
and Ownership
TMS
integrity
Scalability FI Protocols used
F. Almenárez et al [28] SAML PocT Low Low Medium Low SAML
H. Gao et al [25] ATNL PocT Low Low Medium Low Any FI protocol
J. Jiang et al [30] RecT High Low High Low SAML
Y. Huang et al [26] RecT Low Low Low Low Any FI protocol
B. Zwattendorfer et al [31] RecT High High High High Any FI protocol
U. S. Premarathne et al [56] RepT Low Low Medium High Any FI protocol
P. Arias et al [43] RepT (Fuzzy logic) High Low High High Any FI protocol
FCMDT model RepT/PrdT (Fuzzy logic) High High High High Any FI protocol
in issuing identity credentials and making identity assertions
without user control in [28] decreases significantly the privacy
of the trust model. In addition, it does not respect the limited
disclosure principle (where the information must be disclosed
on the basis of the "need to know" only), which can lead
to many security and privacy risks. In [25], the use of the
trust negotiation policy language (ATNL) tends to reveal
credentials that may incur the loss of user privacy and control
of information. In [26] the sensitive data can be transmitted to
the cloud identity broker without the user consent. Moreover,
the storing and processing of identity data in a public cloud
brings many privacy and security risks to users. In [43], [56],
there is no control on the disclosure of identity attributes of
the users. However, this feature is achieved in [31] by the
encrypting the sensitive data before transmitting it to the cloud
identity broker and only the user is in control to decrypt it or
to generate re-encryption keys. In addition, the user is able to
select the amount of data to disclose to the CSP and cloud
identity broker. This feature is also followed by our scheme
in the measure of entities trustworthiness.
Furthermore,our approach ensures integrity by taking into
account encryption and digital signature mechanisms. This
feature is also achieved in [30] and [31] through encryption
mechanisms that encrypt the user’s credentials. However, it is
only partially followed by trust models in [25], [28], [56] by
using digital certificates. In [25], data integrity is not respected
because identity data is stored and processed in a public
cloud without using an encryption mechanism which can lead
to many security and privacy issues such as intentional or
unintentional deletion, modification and theft.
The trust models in [25], [26], [28], [30] are not suitable
for cloud environments because of their limited scalability.
The trust model in [28] is based on the SAML language
which was designed for limited-scale identity federation. In
[25], the trust model is not scalable since the number of
users and organizations in the ATNL policy could become
very large, and increase the total number of attributes. The
use of a trusted central controlling authority in [30] decreases
significantly their flexibility and scalability. The centralized
trust management might have to generate a lot of loads,
resulting in an inefficient system. In [26] the dependency
of users and CSP on the same central cloud identity broker
for identification decreases significantly their scalability and
flexibility. The trust models in [31], [56] are more scalable than
other models. However, in [31], the static federation of brokers
which depend on bilateral agreements between brokers in [31]
limits the flexibility of their trust model. From the results of the
experiments, our trust model seems to be able to support large-
scale cloud environments and it is more flexible than the trust
model in [31]. In addition, our solution, as well as the solutions
in [25], [26], [31], [43], [56] is extensible to adapt the different
kinds of identity federation protocols. However, models in
[28] and [30] are only used with the SAML federated identity
protocol. Finally, this comparison shows that our trust model
comprehensively captures the essential FIM characteristics for
effective and successful use in a cloud computing environment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The concept of trust is very important for FIM systems as
the parties involved in the federation need to rely on each
other before exchanging user sensitive information and trust
that information. In this paper, we have analysed the main
existing frameworks for identity federation and highlighted
their limitations for deployment in cloud computing. Our
study shows that the underlying trust models are too rigid
to allow dynamic federation establishment, especially between
previously unknown entities. Our trust model overcomes these
limitations by introducing a dynamic management of trust
relationships for FIM. The proposed model introduces the
FCMs into modelling and evaluating the trustworthiness of
unknown entities. The effectiveness of this technique to model
the uncertainty of trust was widely proven by prior studies.
To evaluate the performance and computational efficiency of
our model, we performed intensive tests and experiments; the
results proved the effectiveness of our approach in evaluating
the trustworthiness of both CSP and IdP. Furthermore, we
conducted comparison and analysis between the proposed
model and the models analysed in section II. The comparison
showed the superiority of our approach in terms of flexibility
and efficiency over the other models.
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For future work, we intend to conduct in-depth investigation
on how to provide more desired properties, such compliance
and security. Moreover, we will apply the solution to real
cases (with more scenarios)in real cloud environment to gather
feedback and requirements.
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